By Mohammed Abdi
The ongoing conflict in Somalia between the federal government and the militant group al-Shabaab has entered a familiar, protracted stalemate, marked by cyclical territorial gains and losses that challenge long-term stability. Recent evaluations highlight a complex security landscape where domestic military limitations intersect with new, foreign-funded training initiatives. The situation presents a multi-layered challenge for the Horn of Africa, as the federal government struggles to maintain control over liberated zones while simultaneously navigating the geopolitical implications of external military interventions. For a nation long beset by fragmentation, the current equilibrium raises critical questions about the viability of current counterterrorism strategies and the ultimate effectiveness of relying on international security actors.
Recent operational setbacks face the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, particularly in central Somalia’s Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. Areas successfully recovered by government forces during intensive campaigns between 2022 and 2023 have largely reverted to al-Shabaab control following a swift and coordinated counteroffensive by the group in early 2025. This reversal has largely erased the territorial advancements achieved during previous government offensives, restoring a map of control remarkably similar to the baseline observed prior to 2022. The rapid loss of these strategic territories underscores the persistent difficulties the federal state faces in shifting from active combat operations to long-term stabilization and governance in recovered regions.
Reports from independent organizations, such as the International Crisis Group, point to structural hurdles within the state’s security apparatus as primary drivers of these setbacks. Foremost among these issues is the lack of a sustainable, professional military force capable of holding territory once the initial frontline offensive concludes. The federal army continues to battle high desertion rates, insufficient training, logistical bottlenecks, and widespread allegations of corruption that undermine operational morale. Furthermore, the lack of consistent political support and coordination between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States has prevented the creation of a unified front against insurgent forces.
Compounding these structural institutional deficiencies are the significant difficulties encountered when attempting to integrate local clan militias into a cohesive national security framework. While relying on clan mobilization initially provided the federal government with vital manpower and local intelligence during the 2022–2023 offensives, the long-term results have been mixed and fragile. These irregular forces often operate under localized loyalties rather than a centralized military command, leading to inconsistent performance on the battlefield and friction with regular army units. Without a standardized system for integration, compensation, and training, these tribal alliances have proven insufficient for sustaining long-term territorial control.
Beyond the battlefield, political distractions throughout 2024 severely diminished the momentum of the government’s counterterrorism campaigns. Broad political focus within Mogadishu shifted away from the frontlines toward domestic contentious issues, including complex disputes over proposed constitutional amendments and escalating tensions with various Federal Member States. Additionally, regional diplomatic crises consumed significant diplomatic and administrative energy, diverting critical resources and strategic focus away from the ongoing military campaign. This political fragmentation allowed the focus on security operations to fracture, providing the insurgent forces with the necessary breathing room to regroup and strategize.
In contrast to the government’s institutional friction, al-Shabaab has demonstrated a high degree of tactical adaptability and organizational resilience rather than overwhelming military dominance. Following a period of strategic assessment during the height of the government’s initial campaign, the group successfully reorganized its leadership cadre and enhanced its internal intelligence capabilities. By adjusting its battlefield tactics to exploit the gaps left by overextended federal forces, the group launched its 2025 counteroffensive with high operational efficiency. This ability to absorb losses, restructure rapidly, and strike back effectively highlights the deep-seated nature of the insurgent challenge in central Somalia.
Furthermore, al-Shabaab has modified its approach to local governance in certain contested areas to minimize public backlash and solidify its presence. In a bid to counter the government’s clan-mobilization strategy, the group has engaged more extensively with traditional clan structures, occasionally easing its strict local restrictions and facilitating humanitarian aid access to vulnerable populations. These pragmatic adjustments are designed to reduce local resistance and build a degree of compliance among rural communities, all while the group maintains its rigid ideological control and revenue-extraction networks. This dual approach of tactical flexibility and strict internal discipline has made the group highly resilient against purely military containment.
As domestic forces face severe capacity constraints, external actors have stepped in to fill the security void, most notably through substantial financial and logistical backing from Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is currently financing a comprehensive nine-month military training project designed to professionalize 5,107 Somali soldiers. The project is based across two major training camps located in Jouri Jabal within the Galguduud region of Galmudug State. This significant financial investment, which followed an official visit by a high-level Saudi military delegation to Somalia in late June, marks a renewed effort by Riyadh to establish a firm security foothold in the strategically vital Horn of Africa.
The introduction of foreign training personnel into this equation has drawn diverse observations from regional security analysts. According to local sources, the training program utilizes specialized international trainers sourced from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa, and Colombia. While the primary goal of bringing in external personnel is to rapidly elevate the tactical and operational capabilities of the Somali recruits, it introduces secondary security risks. Observers express concern that if the underlying issues of corruption, poor retention, and weak institutional loyalty within the defense sector are not resolved, these highly trained personnel could eventually defect to active extremist factions, such as al-Shabaab or ISIS.
Geopolitical analysts have also raised broader regional questions regarding the potential long-term implications of these international security frameworks. Some concerns focus on the possibility of resource diversion, specifically whether these international networks could inadvertently lead to the covert transfer of trained personnel or military assets to adjacent conflicts, such as the ongoing war in Sudan. As regional dynamics become increasingly interlinked, the intersection of foreign financing, international private trainers, and local forces creates a highly volatile security matrix. Ultimately, current research emphasizes that while external military training can enhance immediate capabilities, long-term stability will depend on internal political reforms and establishing a cohesive, accountable domestic governance framework.