By Mohammed Abdi
Somalia is trapped in a broad security quagmire, it faces a series of losses suffered by federal government forces across large swathes of central Somalia at the hands of the terrorist group al-Shabaab and Saudi efforts to secure a foothold in the country through the gateway of arms and military financing.
Despite the dismal failure of previous efforts to finance tribal forces in a country where the government faces mounting allegations of corruption, weeks ago, a report by the International Crisis Group accused “the government of outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of lacking a credible and sustainable military force capable of securing territory previously recaptured, as efforts to expand the army and rely on clan mobilization have produced mixed results, with problems ranging from desertion and inadequate training to inconsistent political support from the Federal Member States.”
Media and Somali observers attention has turned to a military moves led by Saudi Arabia, whose military delegation visited two camps for training Somali forces in Jouri Jabal, in the Galguduud region of Galmudug State, where Riyadh is financing the training project at both camps.
What concerns Somali observers, however, is that Saudi Arabia has brought in mercenaries from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa, and Colombia to train these personnel—according to Somali sources—amid fears that, once trained and armed, some of these recruits could defect to ISIS or the al-Shabaab movement, both of which operate in various Somali cities.
The sources said that 5,107 Somali soldiers are undergoing training, including 2,000 already recruited from the Northeastern Region, with the program lasting nine months, particularly following the visit of the Saudi military delegation to Somalia at the end of last June. Today, concerns center on the possible covert transfer of some of these mercenaries to Sudan to support the army and its Islamist allies there.
Regarding the government’s setbacks in the face of terrorist groups, the Somali Guardian platform says that “the war between the government of outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the armed al-Shabaab movement has once again settled into a prolonged and fragile stalemate after years of advances and reversals by both sides, which have repeatedly reshaped the conflict without resolving it.”
The platform cites a new report by the International Crisis Group stating that “the current balance of power reflects a familiar pattern: neither the federal government nor al-Shabaab is capable of achieving decisive military superiority, leaving Somalia trapped in an exhausting cycle of gains and losses that ultimately returns to a point close to where it began.”
The platform points to “the losses recently inflicted on Somali federal forces by al-Shabaab in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelleregions of central Somalia, involving areas that Mogadishu had recaptured between 2022 and 2023 but proved difficult to hold.”
It continues: “The government of the outgoing president struggled to consolidate its control over the recaptured areas, suffering from a shortage of trained personnel, weak coordination with the Federal Member States, and difficulties integrating clan militias into a cohesive security structure. Many recruits left the army after completing their training, while corruption and logistical failures further undermined operational capability.”
Somali Guardian notes that “by 2024, political distractions—including disputes over constitutional amendments, tensions with the Federal Member States, and regional diplomatic crises—diverted attention away from the battlefield, causing the offensive to lose momentum.”
By contrast, “al-Shabaab reorganized its ranks and, after a period of reassessment, launched a broad counteroffensive in early 2025, rapidly recapturing most of the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. These gains largely erased the territorial losses it had sustained during previous government campaigns and restored a map of control similar to that which existed before 2022.”
The report warns that “al-Shabaab, for its part, has demonstrated adaptability rather than overwhelming strength. It reorganized its leadership, enhanced its intelligence capabilities, and adjusted its tactics to recover lost territory. It also modified its approach to governance in certain areas, seeking to reduce local backlash by easing some restrictions, engaging more extensively with clan structures, and facilitating humanitarian aid access, without relinquishing its strict ideological control.”
Looking ahead, the International Crisis Group warns that “in the absence of fundamental reforms, Somalia is likely to remain trapped in this equilibrium,” noting that “military solutions alone are insufficient, as political fragmentation within Somalia’s federal system continues to undermine counterterrorism efforts.”
The ongoing conflict in Somalia between the federal government and the militant group al-Shabaab has entered a familiar, protracted stalemate, marked by cyclical territorial gains and losses that challenge long-term stability. Recent evaluations highlight a complex security landscape where domestic military limitations intersect with new, foreign-funded training initiatives. The situation presents a multi-layered challenge for the Horn of Africa, as the federal government struggles to maintain control over liberated zones while simultaneously navigating the geopolitical implications of external military interventions. For a nation long beset by fragmentation, the current equilibrium raises critical questions about the viability of current counterterrorism strategies and the ultimate effectiveness of relying on international security actors.
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